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A New Era in peacekeeping for the United Nations: Leaving traditional peacekeeping behind

Abstract

This paper seeks to demonstrate the gradual transformation that the United Nations peacekeeping has undergone during the post-Cold War era. The recent peacekeepers not only keep, but also build the peace in certain circumstances. The study investigates this shift from traditional peacekeeping to second generation peacekeeping by focusing on the peacekeeping concept, the historical evolution of the mission, the reasons behind this transformation, and the differences between those two types of missions from a comparative perspective as well as the future challenges.

Keywords: United Nations, peacekeeping, post-Cold War era, international law.

JEL Classification: K33.

Introduction

The creation and the development of a peacekeeping function is one of the most crucial achievements of the United Nations (UN) towards materializing its mission of maintaining the international peace and security. The peacekeeping function of the UN which is known as “traditional” or “old” peacekeeping during the Cold War era includes simple activities such as monitoring the cease-fire agreements after the termination of the conflicts within the inter-state and intra-state conflicts notably the former.

The current international agenda reveals that after the end of the Cold War, the traditional peacekeeping perception has undergone through significant changes. Both the principles and the activities included in the peacekeeping operations have been affected within the emergence of the new world of disorder.

The new peacekeeping operations are more assertive and interventionist in nature in order to be capable of responding to the ethnic and religious intra-state conflicts successfully. The peacekeepers one day can be seen in the middle of the hot fire in Somalia, while the other day they can support the birth of the new government in Cambodia.

This study focuses on this gradual shift from the traditional peacekeeping to the second generation peacekeeping. In the first part of the study, the peacekeeping concept will be examined after providing a brief definition. After having an overview of the historical evolution of the mission, the functioning of peacekeeping will be discussed. In the core part of the study, the emergence of the second generation peacekeeping and the reasons behind this shift will be analyzed from a comparative approach in the context of the differences between these two types of missions. The study will be concluded with some critical assessments regarding the current and future perceptions of peacekeeping.

1. The definition of peacekeeping

The concept of peacekeeping cannot be found in the UN Charter. However, peacekeeping is defined in the Blue Helmets as follows:

“As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the United Nations under Article 42” [United Nation 1991, p. 4].

Goulding’s well-known definition which encompasses all the basic principles of peacekeeping is provided as:

“Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary” [Goulding, 1993, p. 455].

A similar definition is provided within the Article 20 of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Report named “Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping” of June 1992. In that Article,

peacekeeping is considered as a technique that expands the possibilities regarding both the prevention of conflicts and the peacemaking [Boutros-Gali 1992]. Sitkowski advocates that lack of an official definition for peacekeeping in the Charter does not indeed cause a serious problem since it provides the opportunity to adapt the missions in accordance with the nature of the conflicts where necessary [2006, p. 13].

In more simple terms, peacekeeping can be regarded as a means to help and support countries that face and are torn by conflict creating conditions, for realizing the sustainable peace in the global international arena. In that regard, the UN peacekeepers which are composed of notably the soldiers, military officers, civilian police officers and other civilian personnel from several countries conduct the task of monitoring and observing the processes of peace that occur after the terminations of the conflicts and assist the formerly combating parties for implementing the peace agreements that are concluded. This type of assistance occurs in different forms ranging from confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law to economic and social development [United Nations 2004].

Although not precisely mentioned, peacekeeping is derived from the Article 40 of the Charter of United Nations [1945] which provides as follows:

“In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures”. In that respect, peacekeeping function is introduced to strengthen the power provided in this Article. [White 1993, p. 201].

According to Dag Hammarskjöld the second UN Secretary-General, the peacekeeping function of the UN can be regarded as a Chapter VI and a half of the UN Charter [White 1993, p. 184; Latif 2000, p. 29; Sitkowski 2006, p. 13]. It's true that states often did not have the tendency to resolve their disputes within “*pacif settlement*” that corresponds to the Chapter VI of the Charter. Moreover, “*collective enforcement*” of the peace provided within Chapter VII was not always efficient in cases of some extreme East-West disputes with high tension. In that regard, the “*traditional peacekeeping*” emerged to fix this shortcoming in UN ability and activity to respond to crises [Dorff 1996]. It would not be wrong to say that the success of peacekeeping function of the UN relies mostly on the fact that it has limited objectives such as separating the two parts of a conflict not by coercion through invoking military enforcement but notably by seeking

their consent and their cooperation [White 1993, p. 184]. Peacekeeping includes the peaceful interpositioning of UN personnel after the cease fire agreement, both in inter-state and intra-state conflicts [White 1993, p. 187; Hultman, Kathman, Shannon 2014, p. 738]. Therefore, the definitions which limit the peacekeeping concept merely to the inter-state relations would not be sufficient.

2. An overview of the historical evolution of peacekeeping

The UN peacekeeping task has evolved through different historical periods, of which each held its own characteristics. Peacekeeping has been an instrument of the UN since 1948 when the decision to send military observers to Middle East and Kashmir had been delivered [Peters 1995, p. 107].

Wiseman categorized this historical evolution by dividing it into four periods¹ which afterwards has been cited by many scholars focusing on this issue [Hatto 2013, p. 501]. In that context, the period between 1946 and 1956 is considered as the nascent period of peacekeeping during which four observation teams were established. The foundation of UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1956 launched an assertive period in which eight peacekeeping forces were created. This period ended with the withdrawal of UNEF I. Between 1967 and 1973, the UN went through a dormant period which led to the questioning of the effectiveness of the peacekeeping function [White 1993, p. 186; Goulding 1993, p. 452]. Hence, there were no forces created during that period. Due to conflicts arising in the Middle East, the peacekeeping task started to refunction in the early 1970s, which corresponded to a resurgent period. However, after 1978, it was refrozen for a decade due to the decline in East and West relations. In the late 1980s, four forces were created. This was particularly shaped by the intention of the US and the Soviet Union to work together on resolving the regional conflicts [White 1993, p. 186; Goulding 1993, p. 453]. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) founded in 1989, had been a different one in many aspects. Its perception of peacekeeping included cases such as the separation of South African forces and South-West Africa People's Organization guerillas and the peacemaking by means of the supervision and policing of elections paving the way to the independence of Namibia in 1990. This tendency had continued in 1990's within the establishment of some similar forces in Central America, Western Sahara, Cambodia and El Salvador and gave rise to a different understanding of the peacekeeping which turned out to be a function more than simply separating the parties of the conflict [White 1993, p. 185-186]. In 1992, a UN

¹ For a detailed analysis see [Wiseman 1983].

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created in order to respond to the increasing size and complexities of peacekeeping operations [*Peacekeeping Overview* 2004, p. 195].

3. Functioning of peacekeeping in general terms

Peacekeeping task is fundamentally conducted by one organization which is the UN. Also it's principally implemented by just one discipline that corresponds to the military, and particularly to the armies [Eyre 2003, p. 27]. The Charter of the United Nations [1945] provides the UN Security Council with the power and responsibility to take collective action with a view to maintaining and restoring international peace and security. Hence, it is the UN Security Council to authorize those peacekeeping operations on the international stage. It is noteworthy that a large number of peacekeeping operations are launched and conducted by the UN through the use of troops under its operational command. In that regard, the costs of the operations are collectively met by the member states of the UN as a part of the expenses of the Organization under Article 17 of the Charter [Goulding 1993, p. 454]. On the other hand, there can be cases in which the UN does not involve directly. In this situation, the UN Security Council gives authorization to some regional organizations or coalitions of voluntary countries for implementing those certain peacekeeping tasks or peace enforcement functions [United Nations 2004].

3.1. The principles of peacekeeping

The classical and traditional UN peacekeeping function finds its most remarkable meaning in the Cold War era. The peacekeeping function during this period is currently referred as the first generation peacekeeping. The peacekeepers were composed of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from different countries. Peacekeepers did not fight fire with fire. In principle, they were deployed after a cease fire agreement came into force [United Nations 2004]. The primary task of the peacekeepers was to implement the peace agreement and to support the peaceful environment provided by the parties after the termination of fighting [United Nations 2008, p. 749].

The peacekeeping process during the Cold War has precise principles and distinctive characteristics. Primarily, the consent of all local parties to the conflict including particularly the host nation has to be provided [Bolton 2001, p. 130; Dorff 1996; Hatto 2013, p. 498]. Having the consent of the main parties to the conflict is crucial in terms of providing the UN with the essential freedom of

action for exercising its tasks both politically and physically. Lack of this consent is likely to create a risk which can cause the UN to shift its stance towards becoming a party to the conflict [United Nations 2008, p. 761]. The acceptance of a cease-fire or a withdrawal, in the meantime is considered to amount to the approval of the parties the existence of a UN force on their soil. In general, this consent is provided from the legitimate national governments of the particular states easier in cases of inter-state conflicts such as between Iran and Iraq. However, in cases of intra-state conflicts in which a legitimate government is hard to exist, such as in the conflict between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus between 1964 and 1974, or such as in the case of Lebanon in 1978 when there exists the consent of a considerably weak government; this becomes a more sensitive issue. The current tendency of the UN in such cases is to provide the consent of all effective groups existing in a civil war situation irrespective of the fact that they are governmental or not. This approach was reflected in case of Former Yugoslavia and Cambodia [White 1993, p. 202]. Whatever difficulty it has in some certain cases, one cannot deny that by taking the consent of the parties, peacekeeping becomes less threatening and more acceptable [Goulding 1993, p. 454]. It's precise that in cases where the consent of the relevant government is not given or is withdrawn, the UN peacekeeping forces have to leave that State's territory unless the UN changes its mandate to an enforcement one [White 1993, p. 202]. There can also be cases in which a party who has given its consent to the UN peacekeeping operation may change its attitude towards restricting the peacekeeping operation's field of action that corresponds to a de facto withdrawal of the primarily given consent. In such cases, the peacekeeping operation shall hold all the necessary skills and resources to be able to conduct the situation properly [United Nations 2008, p. 761]. Moreover, the UN peacekeeping force shall have the continued cooperation of the relevant state during its stay in that territory [White 1993, p. 203]. In other words, the consent of the parties shall continuously be kept during the implementation of its mandate by the UN peacekeeping force [United Nations 2008, p. 761].

A second principle existing in peacekeeping operations is the impartiality of the UN peacekeeping forces which derives from the Article 40 of the UN Charter. However, impartiality shall not be confused with the concept of neutrality. There was no clear conceptual differentiation between them during the period when the traditional peacekeeping understanding had prevailed. However, the changing nature of the peacekeeping operations and the rising need to involve more in the intra-state conflicts led to the distinction of impartiality from neutrality. The new understanding of impartiality can be found in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000, known as the Brahimi Report [2000] which reads as follows:

“[...] Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-forstroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers” [Brahimi Report 2000, para 49].

The Report offers that: “Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time” [Brahimi Report 2000, para 50]. In that regard, impartiality corresponds to the loyalty to mission mandate and the principles of the Charter. This perception of impartiality offers a different understanding from neutrality since it provides the peacekeepers the competence to act against the ones who act against their mandate or the principles they protect [Yamashita 2008, p. 617].

According to Goulding, impartiality also necessitates the peacekeepers not to advance for the benefits and interests of one party against the other. The principle of impartiality derives from the reality that peacekeeping operations are interim measures introduced without prejudices to any claims and positions of the parties of the conflict. Impartiality does not mean that the peacekeepers may not criticize, use pressure or resort to more forceful action in some particular situations such as the violation of cease-fire agreements. It means that the peacekeepers shall not take any sides. Otherwise, they would be in breach of the conditions accepted by the parties [Goulding 1993, p. 454-455].

For instance, after the Gulf War, the UN tried to keep its neutrality in peacekeeping after it had successfully conducted a war against Iraq. It imposed some further conditions on Iraq such as implementing the boundary arrangement in accordance with the 1963 Agreement concluded between Iraq and Kuwait. It was an outstanding success for the UN to stay in such neutrality after being a part of the particular conflict [White 1993, p. 204]. That being the case, Sitkowski argues that the impartiality of the actions of the UN forces other than mediating, monitoring and reporting is indeed questionable [2006, p. 14].

A third principle of the UN peacekeeping operations is that the peacekeeping forces are only authorized to use force in case of self-defence within the Article 51 of the UN Charter. This condition does not lead to any problems in cases where the consent of both parties of the conflict is provided. However, the

situation becomes seriously harder in intra-state circumstances which only the host government provides the consent or in cases when the leaders of the effective groups are no more able or willing to control their forces though they have provided the consent earlier. This was revealed in Lebanon in 1978 and Former Yugoslavia [White 1993, p. 204-205].

The last principle is linked with the source of the troops which takes part in the UN peacekeeping operations. As pointed out by Goulding, it would primarily be the national armies and the police forces to create the main source of the UN personnel for those operations. Hence, the member states shall provide the UN with their troops ready for any calls since it will not be practical for the UN to hold a standing army [Goulding 1993, p. 455]. It's clear that the traditional peacekeeping of the Cold-War period has a simple dimension that is aimed to terminate the conflicts within a narrow manner.

3.2. The functions of peacekeeping

In general, peacekeeping includes two main functions² which are observation and supervision of provisional measures that are accepted by the parties of the past conflict. However, these functions alone are unlikely to create peacekeeping. Observation has the limited function of making reports to the UN with regard to the changing circumstances of the relevant conflict whereas peacekeeping goes further by separating the parties to the cease-fire not by means of force, but with the authorization to enforce the peace. Observation teams in that regard, can not be considered as buffer forces. They carry out the task of observing the application of the cease-fire agreement. They mostly are not large in size and are not obliged to make the agreement function effectively and properly as the peacekeeping forces. Observation can be regarded as a flexible device to be used both in intra-state conflicts such as in Indonesia and in inter-state conflicts such as between Iraq and Iran [White 1993, p. 187-188]. The UN troops in that context make their observations and report impartially to the UN on the application of the ceasefire, the troop withdrawal and other issues regarding the cease-fire agreement. Hence, in that way the diplomatic parties gain some time for solving the main causes of the particular conflict [United Nations 2004].

² According to Goulding, the functions of peacekeeping is wider including the preventive early warning, traditional peacekeeping of monitoring cease-fires, supporting the implementation of a comprehensive settlement agreed by parties, protecting the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding and cease-fire enforcement [1993, pp. 456-459]. However, in this study, the functions of traditional peacekeeping concept are restricted within the approach accepted by White, for further information see [1993, p. 192].

The other function is supervision which mostly is used in inter-state conflicts within the creation of a buffer zone between the ex-belligerents. This requires greater effort and different mandate in comparison to observation process. It necessitates a more active role for the UN after the termination of the hostilities. For instance, Middle East has always been the most problematic and complicated area where the peacekeeping forces had to reveal their highest efforts. Hence, the peacekeeping forces in that region had not only conducted the function of separating two or more belligerents, but they carried out more comprehensive functions than the maintenance of Arab-Israeli relations. They controlled over the possibility of further escalation in the area where the two powers of the Cold-War had some supporters who did not hold regional dominance [White 1993, pp. 192-194].

The functioning of a particular peacekeeping force finds its basis in its mandate which can derive from resolutions of the UN Security Council or General Assembly and the reports of the Secretary General. On the other hand, there have been no concrete differences between the mandates that govern the inter-state peacekeeping forces and the intra-state ones. Inter-state peacekeeping forces such as UN Emergency Force (UNEF), UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) have been assigned with the task of supervising a cease-fire in addition to observing the withdrawal of the parties voluntarily from the places occupied before the conflict. One can note that the inter-state peace keeping forces have mostly been successful in carrying out their tasks. On the other hand, the intra-state peacekeeping forces usually carry out more difficult tasks. Therefore their mandate should be different in order to challenge the particular circumstances. The difficulty in intra-state peacekeeping relies on the aforementioned principles of peacekeeping. The consent, the impartiality and limited self-defence are harder to achieve in circumstances of civil-wars such as revealed in UN's experience in Former Yugoslavia [White 1993, p. 206]. Indeed, this fact can facilitate the emergence of a second-generation peacekeeping in which it's hard to meet those principles.

However, the current situation in peacekeeping and observation reveals that the parties of a conflict choose to combine peacekeeping and peacemaking. In other words, the UN peacekeeping and observer forces go further than trying to keep the parties apart or monitoring a ceasefire since the parties agree on a specific method of settling the particular dispute. The most popular method chosen in the intra-state conflicts is the foundation of a democratic government by means of free and fair elections that is parallel with the increasing trend of democracy in the post Cold-War period [White 1993, p. 191].

4. Emergence of a second generation peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era

After the end of the Cold-War period, the world has gone into a new world of disorder as once has been stated by former French President Mitterrand. Hence, the second generation peacekeeping concept emerged due to the instability that had occurred following the collapse of the bipolar world system. As a consequence, the UN entered into a new period in which it started to use more force in comparison to past. The emergence of the second generation peacekeeping was not an implementation of a decision taken by the UN authorities. As Lipson rightfully puts it, it was the new practices of peacekeeping that had developed on an ad hoc basis via some individual missions through the late 1980s and 1990s that shifted the nature of the peace operations gradually in time [Lipson 2007, p. 84]. It sooner became obvious that the post-Cold War peacekeeping process which particularly focused on inter-state and intra-state conflicts indeed necessitated the peacekeepers to be governed by new and multiple tasks and face more complicated situations in comparison to past experiences [Berdal, Ucko 2014, p. 666].

The Brahimi Report focuses on the fact that the UN Secretariat is not in a position of commanding or war-fighting. The report provides that the mission of the UN peacekeepers will not be useful unless they can defend themselves and the peace they preserve, against the peace opponents and the criminal gangs. In that regard, the report on the one hand, leaves the task of war-fighting to the member states and on the other hand, pushes them to collaborate towards providing better trained and more capable forces for UN operations [Durch 2001, p. 5].

In Agenda for Peace, emphasis was put on the increased use of the military force of the UN towards implementing the new strategies of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building³ [Boutros-Gali 1992; Slim 1995].

It's known that the policies of Agenda for Peace are still implemented. However, this implementation is monitored more cautiously by the UN Security Council on a case-by-case and "can-do" basis which is likely to depend on individual national interests. Although, in the early 1992, there had been a large optimism, one still cannot say that the UN has agreed on either any certain universal criteria or any sufficient management capacity for the implementation of military humanitarian interventions [Slim 1995].

In 2008, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support introduced a new doctrine for peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions of the UN. This doctrine, known as "Capstone Doctrine" is regarded as the first initiative

³ For definitions of those strategies, see [United Nations 2008, pp.749-750].

towards the creation of a comprehensive structure as well as a deeper regulation of the UN peacekeeping operations. It's noteworthy that the second-generation peacekeeping is also referred to as "multidimensional peacekeeping"⁴ as laid down in the Capstone Doctrine [Gerchicoff 2013, p. 729; United Nations 2008, p. 22].

In the recent years, there has been a growing tendency for the Security Council to manage the peacekeeping operations in a micro dimension. The Security Council is more willing to be closely consulted and informed regarding the peacekeeping operations since the issues at stake are highly significant and the volume of resources provided for those operations are wider in comparison to past [United Nations 1995, para 39].

5. Main grounds for the gradual shift from traditional to second generation peacekeeping

The main characteristic of the post Cold-War era is revealed by different types of conflicts⁵ such as the ones emerged in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Angola, Georgia, Rwanda. The fragmentation of states by reason of uncontrolled socio-ethnic wars has become one of the fundamental security threats of the new century. However, the international community, tried to challenge these new issues with an old device of peacekeeping which needed to be revised since the dynamics of these conflicts are different and hard to overcome. The biggest challenge is that there is not a clearly identifiable enemy. In most of these cases, the UN needed to go further than a traditional peacekeeping operation such as in situations of Somalia and Rwanda which the UN forces were not sufficient to prevent the killings of both the civilian population and the UN soldiers. In Somalia, they were very little prepared for such a mission whereas in Rwanda, 2500 Blue Helmets placed in the country were withdrawn at the moment when they were needed the most [Kühne 1995, pp. 31-34]. In short, the end of the Cold War and the rise of the problem of the intra-state conflicts can be regarded to constitute the two main causes of the shift from traditional towards second generation peacekeeping. Lipson also draws attention to the increased co-

⁴ Moreover, some authors divide peacekeeping operations into three stages including the very recent third generation peacekeeping operations. For further information see [Schnabel 1997]. They call the third generation peacekeeping as the muscular, enlarged or wider peacekeeping in which the resort to use of force is implemented to the highest degree among the three types which can even be regarded to be in breach of the UN Charter, notably in civil conflicts. However, in this study, since there is not a clearly defined certain line between the second generation peacekeeping and the extreme third generation operations, the distinction is made between the traditional and the second generation operations within an approach of including the third one in the latter.

⁵ Most of these intra-state conflicts emerge by reasons of ethnic, religious, nationality and racial characteristics and differences between several groups. See [Weiner, Ariza, Andres 2015, p. 2].

operation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to be effective on this transformation process [Lipson 2007, p. 87].

States having disorders which can also be called as failed or failing states are likely to have difficulties in their governability and can become potential targets for internal or external disturbances and insurgencies. What's more, a failed state can pose threats to its neighboring countries in terms of the security concerns since it carries the potential of leading to the destabilization of a whole region [Dorff 1996]. There has been an increase in the number of the failing states which are less likely to be capable of governing and carrying out many and several responsibilities of a modern state after the end of the Cold-War. The UN in that respect, has aimed to conduct a stronger role regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, the US, during the post Cold-War era has introduced a strategy of democratic peace which encompasses the approach that democracies do not go into war with other democracies. Therefore, it has begun to carry out the mission of expanding democracy to other communities notably the third world countries [Dorff 1996]. Certainly, this approach was in conformity with the US's other vital interests regarding free market economies in the centre of the globalization process throughout the world. However, the intervention of the US in internal affairs of other countries also raised another question other than it's being whether or not legitimate. The international community this time focused on the means used for reaching those objectives which concern the use of military to a high extent. In the beginning, there was optimism in the resort to use of force towards the promotion of democracy. However, concrete situations revealed that it was not always the case. The operations in Somalia brought a sharp end to that overwhelming optimism. According to Dorff, problems regarding mission creep, the command and control of UN operations and the desirability of using US military personnel for the purpose of promoting democracy by means of peace operations caused to a complete rethinking of the ways and devices to support that strategy [Dorff 1996]. On the other hand, Kühne argues that the use of force by the UN is necessary since other non-military means like economic and other sanctions of conflict prevention and management are not sufficient to overcome those cases. Notably in socio-ethnic conflicts, non-military sanctions are expected to show their effects in mid and long terms while civilian population loose their lives in short term. However, one still cannot deny the fact that the military devices can not be the solution to those kinds of conflicts which are indeed a deal of negotiation within implementing some political, social and economic measures. In that regard, the application of non-military and military means is deemed to be complementary to each other rather than substituting [Kühne 1995, pp. 36-38].

6. Differences between old and new peacekeeping

It is clear that the first generation UN peacekeeping has started to change into a second generation type in which the UN forces have begun to intervene in the middle of civil wars when they are still “hot” rather than the interventions emerging at the end of inter-state wars when they are “frozen” or in remission [Slim 1995; Wilde 2004, p. 75]. In other words, peace has begun to be enforced by the UN since this new concept somehow motivates the Security Council towards acting more effectively in the system of collective security [Goulding 1993, p. 451]. The objectives of the new peacekeeping are more comprehensive in comparison to the traditional one. In that regard, the objectives of the new peacekeeping include conflict prevention, guarantee and denial of movement, protection and upholding of human rights, delivery of humanitarian relief under fire, supervision of a comprehensive peace settlement, running elections and overseeing land reform, military assistance to civil structures in a failed state and rebuilding failed states [Slim 1995; Schnabel 1997, p. 564; Mohamed 2005, p. 810; Lipson 2007, p. 88; Hatto 2013, pp. 496-497]. It’s precise that besides the objectives, the activities of the new concept will also differ from the former activities in order to materialize those purposes. The current UN peacekeeping activities possess a more aggressive and interventionist character in comparison to the traditional type. The new peacekeeping can occur in the form of war fighting in Somalia while it can take the form of supporting the birth of new democratic governments in Mozambique and Cambodia [Slim 1995]. In other words, the contemporary peacekeeping has begun to evolve into a more demanding dimension with new responsibilities and currently peacekeeping includes not only keeping peace, but also building peace [Mohamed 2005, p. 810; Hultman, Kathman, Shannon 2014, p. 737].

The new peacekeeping besides its objectives and activities also differ with regard to its principles. In most cases, it hardly maintains or deliberately oversteps the three main principles of traditional peacekeeping. Mostly in cases of emergency and particularly in recent intra-state civil wars, the acquisition of the consent of all parties of a conflict has become extremely difficult [Slim 1995]. The principle of impartiality also became to be closely linked with the self-interests of the several parties participating in peacekeeping operations. It has turned out to be more difficult to ensure a balance for implementing the measures of a mandate while not taking any sides. Politicians and public need to be better informed about the real meaning of impartiality while both the national and international media have to be more cautious when providing information about UN operations [Kühne 1995, p. 41-42].

One has to note that traditional peacekeeping operations in general, do not directly intervene in the political process for ending the conflict. That’s the rea-

son why some traditional peacekeeping operations can last for many years before a permanent political consensus is found between the parties [United Nations 2008, p. 752]. For instance, the UN peacekeeping force in the Middle East has been running for 66 years while the one in Cyprus is currently in its 50th year. The control of those operations has been under the UN command and expenses have been born collectively by the UN member states [Slim 1995]. However, in contrast to this characteristic of traditional peacekeeping operations, second generation peacekeeping operations hold a direct role in the political process towards the resolution of the particular conflict. The Security Council mandates those operations to provide good offices or strengthen national political dialogue among the parties. Multi-dimensional character of second generation peacekeeping operations facilitate the process of reaching a political consensus since those operations represent the collective will of the international community [United Nations 2008, p. 755].

The most outstanding difference between those two types of peacekeeping lies in the increase of the resort to use of force. While traditional peacekeeping forces could be regarded as a non-threatening body under the command of the UN; the current operations prove the opposite of this approach by revealing that it has become an assertive physical authority rather than a traditional moral authority of the past. Moreover, new peacekeeping operations have begun to function under the command of a single nation instead of the collective UN command. For instance, the operations in Somalia were carried out by the US while the ones in Rwanda were conducted by France which differs from the collective control of traditional peacekeeping [Slim 1995; Wentges 1998, p. 4].

Another crucial difference between peacekeeping operations in more specific terms, is the effective command and control of these operations. In traditional peacekeeping, the ineffective command and control is unlikely to cause severe harms since in principle the troops are not involved in fighting while in new peacekeeping, it can lead to serious results such as that observed in Somalia. In Somalia, the lack of unified and parallel command and control is one of the reasons for the failure of the UN peacekeepers [Kühne 1995, p. 46].

It is noteworthy that the number of the peacekeeping operations held under the auspices of the UN during the Cold War and the post-Cold War period are significantly different. While, during the Cold War years, the UN directed only 18 peacekeeping operations, it is seen there has been a remarkable increase in the number of the operations held after that period and is surprising that after the end of the Cold War which corresponds to a shorter period, 51 operations⁶ were

⁶ For details with regard to operations see [United Nations 2014].

made of which some are still present [Slim 1995; Schnabel 1997, p. 565]. What's more, it is not only the UN who faces this situation. One has to note that both regional organizations and multilateral state groups have passed through a similar experience triggered by the increase of the conflicts in the international system [Balas, Owsiak, Diehl 2012, p. 19].

Mohamed argues that the change in the concept of traditional peacekeeping should also lead to a change in the management process that differs from the former one. In that context, a separate management of peacekeeping is offered. In accordance with this approach, the UN system of trusteeships should be renewed and revived towards the creation of a framework for UN interventions in failed states. Hence, the Security Council should control the military and police dimensions of the UN peacekeeping operations while the Trusteeship Council should be assigned with the governance tasks in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. This approach relies on the idea that peacekeeping operations are no longer restricted with issues of security. Since currently they are extended to governance and reconstruction, they indeed encompass matters quite different from the ones addressed by traditional peacekeeping operations [Mohamed 2005, p. 812]. Last but not the least, there has also been a change in the nature of the relevant war-zones. Peacekeeping forces are currently placed in urban centers of population, notably when communal violence occurs [Cumner 1998, p. 13].

7. Some observations with regard to current and future peacekeeping

The UN Security Council is well aware of the fact that the initial enthusiastic period regarding militarism should be followed by a more sensitive period in which the decisions for when and how to conduct those operations best should be considered more cautiously [Slim 1995].

One of the main challenges for the current UN operations is the difficulty in finding the right balance between protection and escalation. In that regard, the UN is considered to be more cautious for not escalating a conflict while trying to protect large scales of communities living within that conflict. However, the task of keeping this balance for the UN is becoming more difficult each day since currently the UN forces are engaged in more complicated situations and carry out the responsibility of intervening and protecting more, in comparison to past [Slim 1995].

Another point to be emphasized is that the Security Council should have some clearly defined criteria regarding the resort to the use of force in peace operations including the humanitarian types. In that regard, the UN will not be considered as revealing double standards in cases it applies force [Goulding

1993, p. 461]. When it uses force in Iraq for instance, one should not need to question the criteria on which this decision was based. Hence, it would be clear why the UN delivered this decision in this particular case and does deliver in other cases related to a state occupying the territory of its neighbor.

Justification of peacekeeping is a significant issue that draws attention with regard to the UN peacekeeping operations. One cannot deny the need for the peace operations in the failed or failing states of the third world. According to Bratt, in the current context, there exists a risk of those operations' to tend to be imperialistic [1999]. Keeping in mind that it is the five permanent members of the Security Council having large colonial powers in the past who mainly decide on the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operations at some point in the world, it will be unlikely to assume that this process continues without the disturbance of any national interests. Bratt points out that during the new peacekeeping era, the prohibition on the participation of the permanent members to the UN peacekeeping operations has been lifted. This led to the emergence of some cases in which the five members had tended to evaluate the peacekeeping processes from their own national benefits. The establishment and conduct of those operations have gained a highly sensitive character when the superpowers attempted to achieve their own foreign policy goals such as the US's conduct of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia although it initially was intended to be a UN operation [Bratt 1999, p. 67]. The US issued the Presidential Decision Directive 25, named as US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations during the Clinton Administration. The Directive was issued to provide the US administration with the ability to seek the most flexible alternatives in responses to international crisis. It is interesting that the Directive while speaking about the conflicts threatening core US interests, cautiously provides that multilateral peacekeeping operations will not be allowed to endanger the main mission of the US forces which is to fight and win regional conflicts. Therefore the US is left free to choose among several missions after assessing the potential costs and benefits of each mission and its relevance to US national security [Sokolsky 1995, p. 286].

It is also crucial to assess whether or not the international community is willing to afford the costs of the new peacekeeping operations since they will have high costs due to the increases in the military expenses emerging during those operations. Then one questions whether these expenses will be borne by the governments of the countries sending their troops with financial contributions from their allies such as in case of the Gulf War or collectively by the member states as a whole [Goulding 1993, p. 462] since multilateral peacekeeping operations do not encompass the programme for funding. [United Nations 2008, p. 756]. On the other hand, Agenda for Peace, puts emphasis on the fact that despite the willingness of

the member states to participate in the peacekeeping operations, in some cases serious problems have occurred regarding the shortcomings in military personnel and the equipment to be provided for the UN operations [Boutros-Gali 1992; Langille, Keefe 2003, p. 8].

It's noteworthy that in peacekeeping operations, the humanitarian aid provided by the peacekeepers has the possibility to prolong the war. It can cause a stalemate instead of ending the conflict. Bratt draws attention to the fact that though the peacekeepers try to practice otherwise, it is mostly the armies who get the aids before it reaches to the civilian population. Therefore peacekeepers are often criticized for supporting the armies [Bratt 1999, p. 70-71; Gilbert 1996, p. 2]. Some commentators even argue that humanitarian aid flamed the wars in both Somalia and Bosnia [Bratt 1999, p. 71; Weiss 1995, p. 170].

As mentioned earlier, the new peacekeeping operations can be placed between the Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. However, this leads to the blurring of the traditional clear-cut distinction between those two approaches and creates a grey area. Nevertheless, the changing face of the new world order notably with regard to the ethnic conflict issues, does not only blur the distinction between the Chapters of the UN, but also removes the distinction between the domestic and international; state and non-state actors as well [Kühne 1995, p. 39].

Conclusions

There is no controversy on the fact that the traditional peacekeeping concept has lost its meaning within the end of the Cold-War. Currently, the UN peacekeeping has gone further than keeping the peace to building it. However, it's also clear that the new peacekeeping is quite demanding from many aspects.

On the other hand, the increasing amount of the inter-state conflicts in such a short period during the post Cold-War era, reveal that the resort to use of force can neither be "with" or "without". Although the consequences of the use of force in concrete cases mentioned above, removed the enthusiastic perception and the initial optimism felt by the international community with regard to new peacekeeping, the nature of the socio-ethnic conflicts do not permit other means than military to resolve the disputes alone. Therefore, an approach which combines the non-military devices with the minimum, but essential military devices is better to be sought in accordance with the peculiarities of each particular case that occurs.

However, in comparison to past, the new peacekeeping is more likely to carry the risk of being used arbitrarily by member states notably the five super-powers in accordance with their own national interests. Therefore, it will not be

wrong to say that the intention of the superpowers will be significant in shaping the future peacekeeping concept. Finally, the credibility of the UN operations will surely increase if the lessons are learned well from the cases of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia regarding the command and control of the troops which is of high importance.

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